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Abstract: 
Researchers have recently begun to examine the neural basis of musical improvisation, one of 
the most complex forms of creative behavior. The emerging field of improvisation neuroscience 
has implications not only for the study of artistic expertise, but also for understanding the neural 
underpinnings of domain-general processes such as motor control and language production. This 
review synthesizes functional magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI) studies of musical 
improvisation, including vocal and instrumental improvisation, with samples of jazz pianists, 
classical musicians, freestyle rap artists, and non-musicians. A network of prefrontal brain 
regions commonly linked to improvisatory behavior is highlighted, including the pre-
supplementary motor area, medial prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, and dorsal premotor cortex. Activation of premotor and lateral prefrontal regions suggests 
that a seemingly unconstrained behavior may actually benefit from motor planning and cognitive 
control. Yet activation of cortical midline regions points to a role of spontaneous cognition 
characteristic of the default network. Together, such results may reflect cooperation between 
large-scale brain networks associated with cognitive control and spontaneous thought. The 
improvisation literature is integrated with Pressing’s theoretical model, and discussed within the 
broader context of research on the brain basis of creative cognition. 
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1. Introduction 
Improvisation is one of the most complex forms of creative behavior. The improvising musician 
faces the unique challenge of managing several simultaneous processes in real-time—generating 
and evaluating melodic and rhythmic sequences, coordinating performance with other musicians 
in an ensemble, and executing elaborate fine-motor movements—all with the overall goal of 
creating esthetically appealing music. Other forms of artistic performance, while similarly 
demanding, do not require such spontaneous creativity. The question of how musicians 
improvise is relevant not only to the psychology of music, it also has implications for the 
psychology of creativity, as understanding the nature of creativity at a high level of skilled 
performance may shed light on domain-general processes underlying creative cognition. 
Improvisation research may also inform basic cognitive neuroscience because it provides a 
unique look at how acquired expertise shapes brain structure and function. 
An increasing number of studies are employing neuroimaging methods to explore the brain basis 
of spontaneous musical composition, using samples of jazz pianists, classical musicians, 
freestyle rap artists, and non-musicians. Much of this research has focused on understanding the 
extent to which brain regions associated with executive control mechanisms underlie improvised 
behavior. Does improvisation rely on the musician’s ability to control the creative process, or 
rather on his or her ability to “let go” of control and allow spontaneous processes to unfold? This 
review examines the issue of cognitive control in creative thought with the overarching goal of 
understanding the cognitive and neural underpinnings of musical improvisation. 
1.1. Pressing’s model of improvisation 
Perhaps the most influential model of musical improvisation was developed by Pressing, 
1988 and Pressing, 1998. Following in the literature on expert performance (Ericsson et al., 
1993), Pressing’s theory is grounded in the notion that improvisation is an acquired skill that 
requires a substantial amount of training to achieve expertise. A large body of research in a range 
of domains suggests that expertise is achieved through deliberate practice, an individually 
tailored regimen of intensive training typically undertaken with the guidance of an expert 
instructor (Ericsson et al., 1993). According to the deliberate practice view, eminence in a 
domain is rarely achieved without thousands of hours of deliberate practice: Ericsson and 
colleagues have repeatedly demonstrated that experts typically engage in 10,000 h of deliberate 
practice over the course of ten years before achieving eminence in their field (i.e., the “10-year 
rule”; Simon and Chase, 1973). Recently, however, researchers have emphasized the role of 
general cognitive abilities (e.g., working memory capacity; Meinz and Hambrick, 2010) and 
genetic predispositions (Ericsson, 2013 and Tucker and Collins, 2012) in explaining expert 
performance, thus providing support for the notion that practice is “necessary but not sufficient” 
for high-level performance (Hambrick et al., 2014 and Hambrick and Meinz, 2011). 
Domain-specific expertise seems especially relevant to musical improvisation. In addition to the 
physical and psychological constraints common to other domains of skilled performance, jazz 
musicians must perform under extraordinary temporal constraints. Improvising requires the 
simultaneous execution of several processes in real-time, including sensory and perceptual 
encoding, motor control, performance monitoring, and memory retrieval, among others 
(Pressing, 1988). Deliberate practice automates some of these processes, freeing attentional 
resources for other higher-order processes (e.g., generating and evaluating musical ideas). In the 
absence of such improvisational fluency, the improviser will have difficulty effectively 
interacting with other members of an ensemble and exerting control over the development of his 
or her performance. 
According to Pressing’s model, improvisational expertise involves the interplay between referent 
processes and a domain-specific knowledge base. Referents consist of cognitive, perceptual, or 
emotional processes; the knowledge base consists of hierarchical knowledge structures stored in 
long-term memory (Pressing, 1988). Pressing described referents as a series of well-rehearsed 
retrieval cues that are deployed during performance, minimizing processing demands and 
guiding idea generation. Referents interact with procedural and declarative information stored in 
a domain-specific knowledge base. Through deliberate practice, musicians build a database of 
generalized motor programs, which can be fluently accessed and executed during performance. 
Another component of Pressing’s model is perceptual feedback and error correction. These 
processes allow the improviser to minimize the distance between intended and actual 
performance (Pressing, 1988 and Pressing, 1998). Pressing distinguishes between short-term 
(ongoing motor movements) and long-term (decision making and response selection) feedback—
both of which are essential for improvisational fluency. In contrast to “open-loop” theories of 
skilled performance, which consist of a simple input, processing, and output procedure, Pressing 
advances a “closed loop” model, which extends open-loop models by including feedback 
integration within the system. Ongoing performance is thus monitored by comparing actual 
output with intended output, and future performance is adjusted accordingly. 
Pressing (1988) conceptualized improvisation as a series of generative and evaluative processes. 
Although these processes involve some level of cognitive control and conscious monitoring, 
Pressing emphasized the role of automatized motor processes and routines (e.g., well-rehearsed 
action sequences). Because of the high demands on information processing and decision-making, 
Pressing argued that improvisational fluency relies on automatized processes that require 
minimal conscious attention. The extent to which creative thought relies upon such top-down and 
bottom-up processes remains a point of debate in the literature on musical improvisation as well 
as in the literature on domain-general creative cognition (cf. Abraham, 2014, Beaty et al., 
2014c, Jung et al., 2013, McMillan et al., 2013,Mok, 2014 and Sowden et al., 2014). 
1.2. Domain-general creative cognition 
The study of musical improvisation provides an opportunity to investigate creativity at a high 
level of skilled performance. Although improvisation research has traditionally been restricted to 
the field of musicology, it is also of growing interest to researchers in the field of creativity 
science. Several literature reviews and meta-analyses on the neuroscience of creativity include 
studies on musical improvisation (e.g., Dietrich and Kanso, 2010; Gonen-Yaacovi et al., 2013). 
Moreover, results from behavioral and neurophysiological research suggest that improvisation 
taps domain-general processes such as divergent thinking (Beaty et al., 2013) and cognitive 
flexibility (de Manzano and Ullén, 2012b). 
The cognitive and neural basis of creative thought has been a topic of increasing empirical 
interest. Much of this work has employed divergent thinking tasks, the most common of which is 
the alternate uses task. Such tasks require the generation of novel uses for everyday objects (e.g., 
a brick), and they are typically scored in terms of fluency (the number of ideas) and originality 
(the creative quality of ideas). A growing body of evidence suggests that individual differences 
in divergent thinking reflect a domain-general creative ability: performance on divergent 
thinking tasks has been shown to predict both past and future creative achievements (Jauk et al., 
2014, Plucker, 1999 and Torrance, 1988). Moreover, a recent study found that divergent thinking 
ability in jazz students predicted expert ratings of improvisational performance, controlling for 
cumulative lifetime practice hours (Beaty et al., 2013). 
Researchers have long conceptualized creative cognition as an associative process that passively 
unfolds in long-term memory (Mednick, 1962). In general, such work suggests that creative 
ideas largely result from the spreading activation of concepts in semantic networks, and that 
individual differences in creative ability result from variation in the structural organization of 
semantic memory. More recently, researchers have explored the cognitive processes involved in 
divergent thinking, the ability to generate several novel solutions to open-ended problems. 
Behavioral (Barr et al., 2014, Beaty and Silvia, 2012, Beaty and Silvia, 2013 and Benedek et al., 
2014c; Lee and Therriault, 2013; Nusbaum and Silvia, 2011 and Nusbaum et al., 2014; Silvia et 
al., 2013) and neurophysiological (Beaty et al., 2014a, Beaty et al., 2014b, Benedek et al., 
2014, Fink and Benedek, 2014, Fink et al., 2009 and Gonen-Yaacovi et al., 2013) research 
suggests that higher-order cognitive processes underlie creative cognition, such as controlled 
memory retrieval, pre-potent response inhibition, fluid intelligence, and working memory 
capacity. Such processes are hypothesized to support creative thought by providing the executive 
control needed to manage complex search processes and inhibit salient conceptual information 
that can interfere with idea generation (Beaty and Silvia, 2012). 
Recent behavioral and neuroimaging research suggests that musical improvisation may also 
recruit domain-general processes (Beaty et al., 2013 and de Manzano and Ullén, 2012b). 
Although improvisational expertise, like any other acquired skill, is undoubtedly a function of 
domain-specific training, there is evidence to suggest that divergent thinking and domain-general 
mental flexibility play an important role. A growing literature provides support for the notion 
that creative cognition recruits brain regions linked with executive processes (e.g., strategic 
memory retrieval and pre-potent response inhibition). Nevertheless, the role of executive 
processes in creative thought remains a point of contention in both the general creativity 
literature and the literature on musical improvisation. 
1.3. Organization of the review 
The following review synthesizes neuroimaging research on musical improvisation. Table 
1 summarizes the studies included in the review; Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 depict activation foci resulting 
from positive task contrasts in select fMRI studies of improvisation. Pressing’s (1988) theoretical 
model of improvisation is used as a guiding framework for interpreting the brain imaging 
literature. The literature is also framed within the ongoing debate on whether creativity arises 
from controlled cognitive processes. Special attention is given to neuroimaging research on 
domain-general creativity, in light of recent evidence pointing to an overlap between general 
creativity and musical improvisation. The review has three broad goals: (1) to synthesize the 
improvisation neuroscience literature, (2) to provide a conceptual framework for interpreting 
brain imaging results on improvisation, and (3) to integrate these findings with the literature on 
domain-general creative thought. 
Table 1. Summary of methods used to study improvisation with fMRI. 
Study Year # of 
subjects 
Type of musician Contrast Response type 
Bengtsson 
et al. 
2007 11 Classically-trained 
pianists (graduate) 
Improvise > Memory 
retrieval 
MRI-
compatible 
keyboard (12 
keys) 
Berkowitz 
and Ansari 
2008 13 Classically-trained 
pianists 
(undergraduate) 
Improvise 
melody > Improvise 
rhythm 
Conventional 
MRI response 
box (5 buttons) 
Berkowitz 
and Ansari 
2010 26 Classically-trained 
pianists & non-
musicians 
(undergraduate) 
Between-subjects 
design 
Conventional 
MRI response 
box (5 buttons) 
de 
Manzano 
and Ullén 
2012a 17 Classically-trained 
pianists 
(undergraduate) 
Improvise 
melody > Improvise 
rhythm 
MRI-
compatible 
keyboard (12 
keys) 
de 
Manzano 
and Ullén 
2012b 18 Classically-trained 
pianists 
(undergraduate) 
Improvise > Random 
motor generation 
MRI-
compatible 
keyboard (12 
keys) 
Donnay et 
al. 
2014 11 Jazz musicians 
(professional) 
Improvise > Memory 
retrieval 
MRI-
compatible 
keyboard (35 
keys) 
Limb and 
Braun 
2008 6 Jazz musicians 
(professional) 
Improvise > Memory 
retrieval 
MRI-
compatible 
keyboard (35 
keys) 
Liu et al. 2012 12 Freestyle rap 
musicians 
(professional) 
Improvise > Memory 
retrieval 
Optical 
microphone 
Pinho et al. 2014 39 Pianists with 
various levels of 
improvisational 
expertise 
Improvise > Rest MRI-
compatible 
keyboard (12 
keys) 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Visualization of activation foci reported in select studies of improvisation. Note: 
Activation foci and Brodmann area borders were overlaid on an inflated brain using the 
Connectome Workbench. Highlighted regions indicate areas with activation reported in at least 
two of the seven studies included in the figure. For clarity, only positive activation foci are 
displayed. Studies that report only deactivations ( Berkowitz and Ansari, 2010) and only 
functional connectivity results ( Pinho et al., 2014) were not included. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Visualization of cerebellar activation foci reported in select studies of 
improvisation. Note: Activation foci are overlaid on an inflated cerebellum using the 
Connectome Workbench. A posterior view of the cerebellum is depicted. 
A variety of experimental approaches and participant samples have been employed to study 
improvisation (see Table 1). Several notable differences in task design are apparent in the 
literature: while some studies contrasted improvisation with memory retrieval (Bengtsson et al., 
2007 and Limb and Braun, 2008), others contrasted specific modes of improvisation, such as 
melodic and rhythmic (Berkowitz and Ansari, 2008,Berkowitz and Ansari, 2010 and de 
Manzano and Ullén, 2012a). Moreover, some researchers have been interested in analyzing the 
effects of musical expertise (e.g., Berkowitz and Ansari, 2008 and Pinho et al., 2014) and 
collaboration (Donnay et al., 2014) on brain activity during improvisation. Such methodological 
differences are important to consider when comparing results across studies. 
The review is organized by the main experimental paradigms used to study improvisation. I 
begin by summarizing the methods and results of studies within each paradigm (e.g., 
improvisation vs. memory retrieval), noting similarities and differences within and between task 
paradigms. I then draw some parallels between the improvisation literature and neuroimaging 
research on domain-general cognitive and creative abilities. In the Discussion, I highlight some 
emerging trends and conflicting results in improvisation research, focusing on methodological 
variability as a possible explanation for discrepant findings. Finally, I conclude with some 
potential directions for future research. 
2. Experimental methods and results 
2.1. Improvisation and memory retrieval 
A common approach in the improvisation literature is to contrast improvisation with memory 
retrieval. Such designs allow researchers to identify brain regions involved in the spontaneous 
composition of novel melodic sequences, while controlling for the influence of simply recalling 
previously performed sequences from memory. Limb and Braun (2008) conducted one of the 
earliest studies that used this approach. Professional jazz musicians were asked to memorize a 
novel melody before the study. The experimental paradigm involved performing musical 
sequences on an MRI-compatible keyboard while a pre-recorded jazz rhythm section played 
through headphones in the scanner. Participants were cued to perform the memorized melody, 
freely improvise over the pre-recorded rhythm, play a one-octave scale, or improvise. Compared 
to memory retrieval, improvisation was related to activation of a distributed network of brain 
regions, including the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the 
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), among several others. Interestingly, the authors reported 
widespread deactivation of regions within the frontal lobes, including the lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex (LOFC) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). DLPFC deactivation was 
interpreted as reflecting a suspension of inhibitory or conscious monitoring processes, while 
MPFC activity was thought to reflect self-generated, stimulus independent cognitive processes. 
A similar experimental approach was employed by Bengtsson et al. (2007). However, this study 
differed from Limb and Braun (2008) in terms of the memory retrieval condition employed: 
instead of requiring participants to recall a single, overlearned melodic sequence, Bengtsson et 
al. asked participants to retrieve self-generated melodies that were previously improvised in the 
scanner. In addition, improvisation was constrained to modifying simple, eight-bar melodic 
sequences presented, whereas other studies permitted largely unconstrained improvisation 
(e.g., Donnay et al., 2014, Limb and Braun, 2008 and Liu et al., 2012). Bengtsson and colleagues 
reported improvisation-related activity in several prefrontal regions, including the DLPFC, right 
pre-SMA, and bilateral dorsal premotor cortex (PMD). The authors suggest that such activity 
reflects increased demands on selective retrieval and inhibitory mechanisms, as improvisation 
involves selecting responses among a set of competing alternatives; prefrontal regions may also 
be involved in maintaining higher-order generative strategies (cf. Pressing, 1998). Thus, in 
contrast to Limb and Braun (2008), Bengtsson et al. suggest that improvisation places greater 
demands on cognitive and motor control systems. 
Researchers have also been interested in exploring the neural correlates of vocal improvisation 
(e.g., Brown et al., 2006 and Liu et al., 2012). Liu and colleagues recruited professional freestyle 
rap artists to vocally improvise during functional imaging. The authors used a memory retrieval 
task as a baseline to contrast with improvisation. Similar to the experimental designs of Limb 
and Braun (2008), participants recited the lyrics from a prerecorded audio sample composed by 
the authors, or they spontaneously improvised lyrics, using the same instrumental recording. 
Results showed improvisation-related activation of the pre-SMA, the dorsal premotor cortex 
(PMD), and the left IFG, among several other regions. Notably, the authors also 
reported decreased activation of the DLPFC and increased activation of the MPFC. This pattern 
mirrors the results of Limb and Braun’s (2008) study of instrumental improvisation that 
suggested less involvement of executive control mechanisms, although several prefrontal regions 
associated with executive control showed increased activity during improvisation (i.e., pre-SMA, 
PMD, and IFG). 
Such seemingly discrepant findings have led to different interpretations on the role of cognitive 
control in improvisation. Limb and Braun (2008) interpreted DLPFC deactivation as reflecting a 
suspension of inhibitory or conscious monitoring processes. Moreover, activation of the MPFC 
was thought to reflect self-generated, stimulus independent cognitive processes—hallmark 
features of the default mode network (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). This network shows a 
correlated pattern of functional connectivity in the absence of external task demands, thus 
researchers hypothesize that its activation reflects internally-directed attention (Buckner and 
Carroll, 2007). Default mode activity has also been associated with mind-wandering (Andrews-
Hanna, 2012 and O’Callaghan et al., 2015), theory of mind reasoning (Buckner and Carroll, 
2007), and mental simulation (e.g., episodic future thinking; Schacter et al., 2012). According 
toLimb and Braun (2008), activation of default mode regions during improvisation indicates 
internally-driven, self-referential mechanisms, which may allow the improviser to suspend 
conscious monitoring and enter a “flow-like” state. 
This pattern of results was largely similar to Liu and colleagues’ study of lyrical improvisation. 
Both studies reported increased activity of the MPFC and decreased activity of the DLPFC. Such 
findings supported the authors’ contention that spontaneous composition involves the 
suppression of executive control systems and activation of default mode regions. But the results 
of both studies also point to a degree of cognitive control during improvisation, as both Liu et al. 
(2012) and Limb and Braun (2008) reported activation of the ACC, SMA, PMD, and IFG—
regions associated with cognitive and motor control. 
2.2. Melodic and rhythmic improvisation 
Pressing (1988) conceptualized improvisation as a dynamic interplay between several processes, 
including the generation, evaluation, and execution of novel motor sequences. Investigating such 
a multi-component processes poses challenges for researchers attempting to isolate its neural 
correlates. The experiments described above contrasted relatively unconstrained improvisation 
with some form of basic memory retrieval (e.g., Limb and Braun, 2008 and Liu et al., 2012). 
Although these approaches tend to preserve the complexity and ecological validity of 
improvisation compared to others, they also typically yield a large number of significant 
activation peaks, raising questions about the role of specific sub-processes (Berkowitz, 2010). A 
more nuanced approach has been to examine different modes of improvisation, such as melodic 
and rhythmic improvisation. 
Berkowitz and Ansari (2008) employed experimental conditions that varied in terms of melodic 
and rhythmic constraints. The authors used tasks that allowed for more or less spontaneous 
behavior within each mode of improvisation. In a fixed rhythm and free melody condition, for 
example, rhythm was constrained by a metronome and the notes were freely chosen by the 
participants; this permitted an analysis of brain activity related to melodic improvisation, 
controlling for the influence of rhythmic variability. Results showed that improvising novel 
melodic patterns was related to activation of bilateral dorsal PMD, the ACC, and the right 
supramarginal gyrus (SMG); melodic improvisation was also related to the deactivation of 
several brain regions, including the right angular gyrus, the right superior frontal gyrus, and 
bilateral posterior cingulate. In contrast, rhythmic improvisation was related to increased activity 
in the ACC, the left IFG, bilateral PMD, and the left superior and inferior parietal lobules (IPL). 
A conjunction analysis, which analyzed the common activity of melodic and rhythmic 
improvisation, found significant activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), PMD, and 
rostral ACC. Berkowitz and Ansari (2008) thus revealed common and distinct neural correlates 
of melodic and rhythmic improvisation, providing greater insight into general and specific 
aspects of spontaneous composition. 
Several prefrontal and parietal brain regions have often been associated with improvised 
performance. Two of the most frequently implicated regions are the pre-SMA and the PMD, 
regions involved in the coordinated selection of novel motor sequences (Beudel and de Jong, 
2009). These regions were among the most commonly activated in studies contrasting 
improvisation with memory retrieval (e.g., Bengtsson et al., 2007 and Liu et al., 2012). Although 
these regions appear to be responsible for similar processes, past research suggests subtle 
differences in their functional roles in motor behavior, which has important implications for 
understanding their contribution to musical improvisation. On the one hand, the pre-SMA is 
commonly implicated in the generation, perception, and learning of temporal-motor sequences 
(Bengtsson et al., 2004, Bengtsson et al., 2009, Karabanov et al., 2009 and Schubotz and von 
Cramon, 2001). On the other hand, the PMD is commonly implicated in tasks involving the 
generation, perception, and learning of spatial-motor sequences ( Bischoff-Grethe et al., 
2004 and Bengtsson et al., 2004). 
In light of the differential functions of the pre-SMA and the PMD, de Manzano and Ullén 
(2012a) sought to determine their unique contributions to musical improvisation by manipulating 
spatial and temporal aspects of spontaneous composition. Similar to Berkowitz and Ansari 
(2008), this experiment involved constraining either melodic or rhythmic improvisation. Results 
showed that melodic improvisation was associated with increased activity in both the left PMD 
and the left pre-SMA; rhythmic improvisation was also associated with increased activity in the 
left pre-SMA. The role of the pre-SMA in improvisation was further supported by de Manzano 
and Ullén (2012b), who explored whether musical improvisation taps similar neural substrates as 
pseudo-random response generation (PRG)—a domain-general measure of cognitive flexibility 
that requires top-down control to generate novel motor sequences (Beudel and de Jong, 2009).de 
Manzano and Ullén (2012b) asked participants to spontaneously compose melodies or press the 
keys of an MRI-compatible keyboard in a random fashion. A conjunction analysis revealed 
increased activation in bilateral IFG, bilateral pre-SMA, left DLPFC, right ACC, bilateral insula, 
and bilateral cerebellar regions. Interestingly, an analysis exploring the brain activity unique to 
improvising notes compared to pseudo-random generation did not reveal any significant 
differences, suggesting widespread overlap between the two conditions. The reverse contrast, 
however, revealed several areas related to random generation, including the right temporoparietal 
junction (TPJ), medial and lateral premotor areas, the DLPFC, and the cerebellum. 
The results of de Manzano and Ullén (2012a) and Berkowitz and Ansari (2008) suggest that the 
premotor cortex plays a central role in melodic and rhythmic improvisation. Across both studies, 
the dorsal PMD showed robust activity during conditions requiring spontaneous generation of 
rhythmic sequences. de Manzano and Ullén (2012b) conclude that melodic improvisation and 
pseudo-random motor movements recruit some of the same neural mechanisms. Similar to other 
studies of melodic and rhythmic improvisation, the pre-SMA was found to play a critical role. 
This notion was further reinforced by activation of other regions involved in executive processes, 
such as the left DLPFC, right ACC, and bilateral IFG. Activation of prefrontal regions were also 
reported in studies contrasting improvisation and memory retrieval (e.g., Bengtsson et al., 
2007 and Donnay et al., 2014). 
Berkowitz and Ansari (2008) provide support for several of Pressing, 1988 and Pressing, 
1998 theoretical predictions. Pressing conceptualized improvisation as the generation, selection, 
and execution of novel melodic and motor sequences, processes that appear to correspond to the 
functional roles of brain regions reported in Berkowitz and Ansari (2008). Specifically, the left 
IFG is associated with performance on tasks that require controlled retrieval from long-term 
memory (e.g., verbal fluency; Badre et al., 2005 and Hirshorn and Thompson-Schill, 2006). 
Moreover, Berkowitz and Ansari (2008) reported activation of the ACC during both melodic and 
rhythmic improvisation. The ACC is associated with conflict monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2004), 
voluntary selection (Forstmann et al., 2006), and decision making (Walton et al., 2004)—all of 
which are components of Pressing’s (1988) model of improvisation. 
2.3. The role of musical expertise 
To what extent does improvisational expertise influence the neural correlates of spontaneous 
performance? Pressing (1988) argued that expertise was critical to improvisational fluency. 
Because improvisation places substantial demands on information processing, Pressing viewed 
expertise as a means to automate low-level sensorimotor and cognitive processes so that 
attention could be allocated to higher-order performance goals. Berkowitz and Ansari 
(2010) provided seminal evidence that musical expertise affects brain mechanisms involved 
during improvisation. The authors used the same experimental paradigm as Berkowitz and 
Ansari (2008) to analyze the effects of musical expertise in improvisation. However, the key 
difference was the sample, which now included a second control group of undergraduate non-
musicians. Analysis of the main effect of melodic improvisation revealed that the only 
significant difference between musicians and non-musicians was a deactivation of the right 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) in musicians. The ability of musicians to deactivate the right TPJ 
during improvisation may thus reflect neurophysiological changes associated with acquired 
expertise. 
Other researchers have sought to determine the role of improvisational expertise by studying 
pianists with a variety of improvisational experience (Pinho et al., 2014). Pinho and colleagues 
contrasted brain activation during improvisation with activation at rest, and correlated this 
activity with self-reported lifetime improvisation hours. Interestingly, improvisational expertise 
was negatively correlated with activation in a right-lateralized network of brain regions, 
including the DLPFC, IFG, anterior insula, and angular gyrus. The authors also specified six 
seed regions of interests (ROIs) based on activations reported in past work (de Manzano and 
Ullén, 2012a and de Manzano and Ullén, 2012b): bilateral DLPFC, bilateral dorsal premotor 
area, and bilateral pre-SMA. A functional connectivity analysis revealed extensive expertise-
related positive connectivity between the prefrontal seed ROIs and other regions of the brain. 
Most notably, experts showed greater functional connectivity between the DFLPC and premotor 
cortex during improvisation (i.e., bilateral PMD and pre-SMA). Premotor seed regions also 
showed widespread connectivity across the cortex and within regions of the cerebellum. 
Pinho and colleagues interpret their findings as evidence in support for Pressing’s (1988) model 
of improvisation. They argue that the relative deactivation of executive control networks in 
experts may correspond to an overall automation of domain-specific cognitive processes, and 
increased functional connectivity between frontal regions may translate to more efficient access 
to pre-learned motor patterns and generative strategies stored in long-term memory. Overall, 
these findings are consistent with Pressing’s (1988) position regarding the function of acquired 
expertise in improvisation—as expertise increases, processing demands should be minimized, 
allowing attention to be allocated to higher-order goals and performance monitoring. 
Berkowitz and Ansari (2010) found that musical expertise was related to a deactivation of the 
right TPJ. The right TPJ lies in close proximity to the right angular gyrus, a region also found to 
be deactivated during improvisation in Berkowitz and Ansari (2008). The right TPJ is part of the 
ventral attention network (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002), which is comprised of the right TPJ and 
ventral frontal cortex. Suppression of this network is thought to reflect top-down control during 
tasks requiring focused internal attention (Corbetta et al., 2008 and Corbetta and Shulman, 
2002). Modulation of the ventral attention network may provide “task shielding” by filtering or 
inhibiting information unrelated to the task at hand (Dreisbach and Haider, 2009); deactivation of 
nodes within the ventral attention network may therefore correspond to internally-directed 
attention during creative idea production (cf. Benedek et al., 2014). Deactivation of the right TPJ 
has also been reported in studies of divergent thinking (e.g., Benedek et al., 2014b and Fink et 
al., 2009), creative writing (Howard-Jones et al., 2005), and product design (Kowatari et al., 
2009). Thus, in the context of Berkowitz and Ansari (2010), deactivation of the right TPJ may 
reflect a greater ability of musicians to focus attention on internal processes during improvisation 
(e.g., generation and evaluation of novel musical sequences; Pressing, 1988). 
2.4. Collaborative improvisation 
Improvisation often occurs in group settings with multiple artists contributing to a common 
esthetic work. Collaborative improvisation is notably different from solo improvisation in terms 
of performance monitoring and perceptual feedback. An individual’s performance must be 
integrated with multiple streams of sensory information (Pressing, 1988). The improviser must 
therefore allocate considerable attentional resources to both internal (e.g., generative) and 
external (e.g., communicative) sources. Recently, Donnay and colleagues explored the neural 
correlates of collaborative improvisation in a sample of professional jazz pianists (Donnay et al., 
2014). The experimental procedure involved “trading fours” with an experimenter (also a jazz 
musician) in a nearby control room; participants and the experimenter took turns performing 
four-bar musical segments—a common mode of improvisation in jazz ensembles. Participants 
used an MRI-compatible piano keyboard and were given headphones to listen to their own and 
the experimenters’ musical performance. A pre-recorded rhythm section also streamed through 
the headphones. Participants alternated between the experimental conditions of interest: playing 
a scale, performing a memorized melody sequence, or improvising; rhythm was constrained to 
one note per beat. 
Compared to performing the memorized melody, improvising was related to increased activation 
of the pre-SMA, bilateral IFG, bilateral DLPFC, and the posterior superior temporal gyrus 
(STG); improvising was also related to deactivation of bilateral angular gyrus. The authors also 
conducted a functional connectivity analysis to determine whether bilateral IFG showed greater 
functional connectivity with other regions during improvisation. This analysis revealed 
significantly greater positive connectivity between the left and right IFG. Bilateral IFG activity 
was also negatively correlated with activity in the STG, and the left IFG was anticorrelated with 
bilateral angular gyrus during the improvisation condition. 
The results of Donnay et al. (2014) provide an interesting contrast to the earlier work of Limb 
and Braun (2008). In Limb and Braun (2008), musicians showed deactivation of the DLPFC, 
suggesting less attention control during improvisation. Moreover, regions of the default mode 
network were found to be more relevant to improvisation in Limb and Braun (2008). Donnay et 
al. (2014), in contrast, reported increased activation of the DLPFC during collaborative 
improvisation. The authors note, however, that the nature of collaborative improvisation appears 
to be different from solo improvisation, which was of interest in Limb and Braun (2008). They 
suggest that collaborative improvisation involves a distinct type of musical communication that 
requires greater demands on performance monitoring. 
3. Discussion 
3.1. Improvisation and domain-general processes 
Neuroimaging studies have shed light on the role of domain-specific training on brain activation 
during improvisation (e.g., Berkowitz and Ansari, 2010 and Pinho et al., 2014). But to what 
extent does improvisation involve domain-general processes? de Manzano and Ullén 
(2012b) found that generating pseudo-random motor sequences activated the same brain regions 
as improvising new melodic sequences. This suggests that generating musical ideas may share 
similar underlying processes as those involved in general cognitive flexibility. The literature on 
general creativity provides further evidence for a relationship between improvisation and 
domain-general creative cognition. Neuroimaging studies of divergent thinking, for example, 
consistently report activation of the left IFG during tasks involving idea generation (for a review, 
see Gonen-Yaacovi et al., 2013). Several studies implicate this region in processes involving the 
generation and evaluation of candidate ideas retrieved from long-term memory (Badre et al., 
2005). Improvisation and divergent thinking may thus recruit selective retrieval mechanisms 
common to the left IFG, providing further support for the theoretical predictions of Pressing, 
1988 and Pressing, 1998. 
The left IFG has been implicated in nearly all of the studies described above (e.g., Berkowitz and 
Ansari, 2008, Donnay et al., 2014 and de Manzano and Ullén, 2012b). In de Manzano and Ullén 
(2012b), for example, a conjunction analysis found that both improvisation and pseudo-random 
key pressing activated the left IFG, as well as the left pre-SMA, the left DLPFC, bilateral insular 
cortex, and bilateral cerebellum. A similar pattern was also reported by Berkowitz and Ansari 
(2008), who found overlapping activation in the left IFG during conditions requiring rhythmic 
and melodic improvisation. A large body of research points to an important role of the left IFG in 
controlled memory retrieval (Corbetta et al., 2008 and Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). Much of 
this work has used verbal fluency tasks to assess the neural correlates of retrieval from long-term 
memory. Verbal fluency tasks are often used to assess deficits in executive functioning (Troyer 
et al., 1998). Such tasks are thought to require attention control and strategic access to memory 
(Unsworth and Engle, 2007). The left IFG seems to be especially involved when demands on 
retrieval increase, such as when competing representations in semantic memory are high and 
when switching between semantic categories is required (Hirshorn and Thompson-Schill, 2006). 
Researchers hypothesize that activation of the left IFG during improvisation reflects similar 
retrieval mechanisms (e.g.,Berkowitz, 2010). Generating melodic sequences, for example, 
requires the dynamic interaction between higher-order generative processes and a domain-
specific knowledge (Pressing, 1998). In this context, the left IFG may support the generation, 
evaluation, and selection of to-be-performed musical sequences. 
The left IFG is often implicated in fMRI studies of divergent thinking. Divergent thinking is a 
domain-general creative thought process that involves generating ideas in response to open-
ended prompts (e.g., inventing alternate uses for common objects). A recent review of 34 fMRI 
studies of divergent thinking found that the left IFG was among the most strongly activated 
during tasks involving creative idea generation (Gonen-Yaacovi et al., 2013). In addition, a 
recent resting-state fMRI study showed greater functional connectivity between the left IFG and 
default mode regions in individuals of high divergent thinking ability (Beaty et al., 
2014a and Beaty et al., 2014b). The left IFG therefore appears to be important for a range of 
cognitive processes requiring controlled search from long-term memory, including musical 
improvisation and divergent thinking. 
Further evidence for a role of the inferior prefrontal cortex comes from a recent study on creative 
drawing (Ellamil et al., 2012). This work examined the neural mechanisms underlying generative 
and evaluative processes related to drawing ability in a sample of undergraduate art students. 
Overall, compared to evaluation, generation was associated with increased activation of the left 
IFG, bilateral premotor cortex, inferior and superior parietal lobes, and bilateral medial temporal 
lobes; compared to generation, evaluation was associated with greater activity in several regions 
within executive control and default mode networks. A functional connectivity analysis further 
revealed greater functional coupling between executive and default networks during evaluation, 
pointing to a greater cooperation between controlled and spontaneous thought processes 
(cf. Beaty et al., 2014a, Beaty et al., 2014b, McMillan et al., 2013 and Mok, 2014). 
A recent behavioral study suggests that musical improvisation may tap individual differences in 
domain-general creative cognition (Beaty et al., 2013). In this study, semi-professional jazz 
musicians were asked to improvise with a trio; they also completed a questionnaire regarding 
their instrumental practice regimen, as well as an alternate-uses divergent thinking task to assess 
general creative thinking ability. The improvisations were recorded and scored for creative 
quality by a team of expert raters. As expected, the number of practice hours was the strongest 
predictor of improvisation scores. But divergent thinking also predicted improvisation scores, 
even after controlling for practice hours. The results of this study and other recent work 
(e.g., Benedek et al., 2014a and Lewis and Lovatt, 2013) point to a potential overlap between the 
ability to generate creative ideas in general and the ability of jazz musicians to generate novel 
musical sequences. 
Pressing (1988) conceptualized improvisation as the interaction between higher-order referent 
processes and long-term memory. The neuroimaging literature on improvisation consistently 
implicates brain regions associated with cognitive control (e.g., the left IFG and the DLPFC); the 
literature also points to an overlap between domain-specific musical improvisation and domain-
general cognitive processes (e.g., de Manzano and Ullén, 2012b). Taken together, a growing 
body of research supports Pressing, 1988 and Pressing, 1998 model of improvisation and further 
suggests that improvisation may rely on general creative processes. 
3.2. The cognitive control of creative behavior 
One point of contention in the literature is whether improvisation is under the deliberate control 
of the improviser. On the one hand, several studies implicate brain regions associated with 
working memory capacity (DLPFC), controlled memory retrieval (left IFG), and volitional 
motor control (PMD; Bengtsson et al., 2007, de Manzano and Ullén, 2012a and Donnay et al., 
2014). On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that such processes are less involved 
during improvisation (Limb and Braun, 2008), and that improvisational expertise corresponds to 
decreased activity within executive control regions (Pinho et al., 2014). Limb and Braun (2008), 
for example, reported widespread deactivation of lateral prefrontal cortex (i.e., the DLPFC) and 
increased activation of the MPFC, a region associated with spontaneous thought processes (e.g., 
mind wandering; Andrews-Hanna, 2012). 
What might account for such discrepant findings? One key methodological difference 
between Limb and Braun (2008) and others is the sample composition: Limb and Braun 
(2008) included professional jazz musicians, while most other studies included either classically-
trained musicians or non-musicians. Studies with classically-trained musicians that report 
increased activity within executive control regions could simply be a function of increased task 
demands, since these musicians are presumably less familiar with improvisation. The results 
of Pinho et al. (2014) suggest that expert improvisers indeed show less activation of lateral 
prefrontal cortex while improvising compared to novices. However, experts also 
showed increased functional connectivity between premotor and executive control regions, 
which suggests that although experts show less activation within lateral prefrontal cortex, they 
also show greater connectivity between such regions during improvisation. Pinho and colleagues 
posit that this pattern may reflect a greater automaticity of cognitive processes in experts 
(cf. Pressing, 1998). 
Another possibility is that decreased activation of prefrontal regions reflects greater neural 
efficiency in experts (cf. Grabner et al., 2006 and Neubauer and Fink, 2009). Because 
improvisation requires the simultaneous execution of several cognitive processes (Pressing, 
1988), the expert improviser, unlike the novice, may be better able to manage these demanding 
processes, thus reflected in lower levels of metabolic activity in lateral prefrontal cortex. Greater 
functional connectivity between premotor and executive control regions further supports a neural 
efficiency hypothesis of improvisational expertise—through practice, musicians may gradually 
strengthen neural connections, facilitating a more efficient transfer of information between nodes 
within a larger neural network. 
Several other methodological differences may also help to explain disparate patterns of results 
across the literature. Berkowitz (2010) notes that Limb and Braun (2008) used an experimental 
design that was less constrained than other studies with classical musicians (e.g., Berkowitz and 
Ansari, 2008 and Berkowitz and Ansari, 2010). According to Berkowitz (2010), Limb and Braun 
“allowed their subject-performers to draw on an actual composition for material, with all of its 
associations—harmonic, melodic, rhythmic, structural, emotions, etc.—in contrast to the much 
more limited possibilities in our study. Thus, in addition to the active regions shared by our study 
and theirs, Limb and Braun saw changes in activity in over forty regions” (pp. 142-
143). Berkowitz (2010) further argues that while the methodological approach of Limb and 
Braun (2008) may be more similar to real-world improvisation, it may not provide the type of 
experimental control required to isolate unique neural mechanisms involved in specific 
improvisational processes (e.g., improvising melodies versus improvising rhythms). 
de Manzano and Ullén (2012a) also point to differences in experimental contrasts chosen across 
studies. Indeed, determining an appropriate baseline condition for contrasting an experimental 
condition of interest is a fundamental issue in fMRI research (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001). de 
Manzano and Ullén (2012a) note that several studies that used similar task paradigms, 
experimental contrasts, and samples reported similar patterns of functional activity, including the 
DLPFC, pre-SMA, and PMD (Bengtsson et al., 2007,Berkowitz and Ansari, 2008, de Manzano 
and Ullén, 2012a and Donnay et al., 2014). Moreover, unlikeLimb and Braun (2008), these 
studies did not report activation within default mode regions (i.e., MPFC), nor did they report 
widespread deactivation of the DLPFC. 
Interestingly, Donnay and colleagues did not replicate the results of Limb and Braun (2008). In 
contrast, they found increased activation of the DLPFC and no significant activation increases in 
the MPFC. The authors pointed to differences in experimental design between their study 
and Limb and Braun (2008)—most notably, the addition of a second musician who collaborated 
with subjects—resulting in greater demands on externally-directed processes associated with 
executive control (e.g., performance monitoring). On the other hand, musicians in Limb and 
Braun (2008) did not have such demands on external attention and could thus focus attention on 
internally-directed processes (e.g., idea generation), possibly reflecting greater involvement of 
default network regions. Future research could further explore the extent to which the default and 
executive networks contribute to improvisation by directly contrasting collaborative and 
individual improvisation. 
Although default and executive activity may correspond to greater demands on internally- vs. 
externally-directed attention, the concurrent activation of both networks’ hubs reported in past 
work suggests that these two networks may not show an antagonistic or “anticorrelated” pattern 
of activity during improvisation. Instead, such networks may exhibit differential involvement as 
a function of task demands (cf. Chrysikou et al., 2014). A growing literature points to several 
cognitive processes associated with large-scale network cooperation, including mind-wandering 
(Christoff et al., 2009), future planning (Gerlach et al., 2014 and Spreng et al., 2010), and even 
cognitive control (Cocchi et al., 2013 and Spreng et al., 2014). Default and executive network 
interaction during improvisation would also be consistent with recent functional connectivity 
analyses showing cooperation between these networks during other creative thinking tasks, such 
as divergent thinking (e.g., Beaty et al., 2014a) and artistic drawing (Ellamil et al., 2012. Such 
tasks are hypothesized to invoke a state of focused internal attention (Andrews-Hanna et al., 
2014 and Benedek et al., 2014d), an ability that seems especially relevant to musical 
improvisation. 
4. Future directions 
In addition to the cognitive processes covered in this review, several non-cognitive, social factors 
are thought to influence improvisation (e.g., group interaction and audience feedback; Sawyer, 
1992 and Sawyer, 2003). McPherson and Limb (2013) raise the question of whether real-world 
creative performance can even be studied empirically without fundamentally changing the 
essence of the art. Although constraining musical performance comes at the cost of ecological 
validity, neuroimaging methods offer powerful tools for isolating specific sub-processes of 
improvisational cognition while controlling for other related processes. Future researchers should 
continue to strike a balance between ecological validity and experimental control (cf. Hasson and 
Honey, 2012). 
Throughout this review, Pressing’s (1998) model was used as a framework for interpreting the 
results of neuroimaging studies on improvisation. Importantly, although the model seems to fit 
with the literature, the extent to which activation patterns reflect theoretical mechanisms remains 
unclear. Indeed, one’s ability to retrospectively associate brain activity with theory relies on 
some degree of reverse inference (Poldrack, 2006). Future work should test specific hypotheses 
related to Pressing’s (1988) model and rely less on reverse inferences. To further validate results, 
researchers could collect behavioral data (e.g., response times) in addition to brain imaging data, 
which could be used to correlate with activation within a specific region of interest (Poldrack, 
2006). Such approaches have already been employed in past work. For example, Bengtsson et al. 
(2007) assessed the numerical deviation of improvised melodies from predetermined templates 
and found that as improvised melodies deviated more from the templates, activation within the 
pre-SMA increased. Future research should use similar approaches to determine the cognitive 
processes underlying musical improvisation. 
Improvisation research should continue to employ both behavioral and neurophysiological 
techniques to study spontaneous creativity. Several innovative methods have already been 
developed to study improvisation behaviorally (e.g., Goldman, 2013, Norgaard, 2011, Norgaard, 
2014 and Norgaard et al., 2013). Improvisation researchers would also benefit from embracing 
new and emerging methods in cognitive neuroscience. Like other forms of complex cognition, 
improvisation involves dynamic communication between regions across the entire cortex. 
Functional connectivity methods provide useful tools for analyzing the relative influence of 
nodes within large-scale functional networks (Bullmore and Sporns, 2009 and van den Heuvel 
and Hulshoff Pol, 2010). Such methods have begun to emerge in the improvisation literature 
(e.g., Donnay et al., 2014, Pinho et al., 2014 and Wan et al., 2014). Adopting a network-based 
approach will allow researchers to move beyond analyzing discrete regions in isolation, and 
transition toward a more fine-grained understanding of the mechanisms underlying musical 
improvisation. 
Acknowledgments 
I thank Mathias Benedek, Donald Hodges, Michael Kane, Jeni Pathman, and Paul Silvia for their 
comments on this manuscript. 
References 
Abraham, A., 2014. Creative thinking as orchestrated by semantic processing vs. cognitive 
control brain networks. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8, 95.  
Andrews-Hanna, J.R., 2012. The brain’s default network and its adaptive role in internal 
mentation. Neuroscientist 18, 251–270.  
Andrews-Hanna, J.R., Smallwood, J., Spreng, R.N., 2014. The default network and self-
generated thought: component processes, dynamic control, and clinical relevance.  
Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 1316, 29–52. Badre, D., Poldrack, R.A., Pare-Blagoev, E.J., 
Insler, R.Z., Wagner, A.D., 2005. Dissociable controlled retrieval and generalized selection 
mechanisms in ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Neuron 47, 907–918.  
Barr, N., Pennycook, G., Stolz, J.A., Fugelsang, J.A., 2014. Reasoned connections: a dual-
process perspective on creative thought. Think. Reason. 21, 61–75.  
Beaty, R. E., Benedek, M., Kaufman, S. B., & Silvia, P. J., 2014a. Default and executive network 
coupling supports creative idea production, Submitted for publication. 
Beaty, R.E., Benedek, M., Wilkins, R.W., Jauk, E., Fink, A., Silvia, P.J., Neubauer, A.C., 2014b. 
Creativity and the default mode network: a functional connectivity analysis of the creative brain 
at rest. Neuropsychologia 64, 92–98.  
Beaty, R.E., Silvia, P.J., 2012. Why do ideas get more creative across time? An executive 
interpretation of the serial order effect in divergent thinking tasks. Psychol. Aesthet. Creat. Arts 
6, 309–319.  
Beaty, R.E., Silvia, P.J., 2013. Metaphorically speaking: cognitive abilities and the production of 
figurative language. Mem. Cogn. 41, 255–267.  
Beaty,R.E., Silvia, P.J.,Nusbaum, E.C.,Jauk, E.,Benedek,M., 2014c. The roles of associative and 
executive processes in creative cognition. Mem. Cogn. 42, 1186–1197.  
Beaty, R.E., Smeekens, B.A., Silvia, P.J., Hodges, D.A., Kane, M.J., 2013. A first look at the 
role of domain-general cognitive and creative abilities in jazz improvisation. Psychomusicol. 
Music Mind Brain 23, 262–268.  
Benedek, M., Beaty, R.E., Jauk, E., Koschutnig, K., Fink, A., Silvia, P.J., Neubauer, A.C., 2014. 
Creating metaphors: the neural basis of figurative language production. NeuroImage 90, 99–106.  
Benedek, M., Borovnjak, B., Neubauer, A.C., Kruse-Weber, S., 2014a. Creativity and 
personality in classical, jazz and folk musicians. Personal. Individ. Differ. 63, 117–121.  
Benedek, M., Jauk, E., Fink, A., Koschutnig, K., Reishofer, G., Ebner, F., Neubauer, A.C., 
2014b. To create or to recall? Neural mechanisms underlying the generation of creative new 
ideas. NeuroImage 88, 125–133.  
Benedek, M., Jauk, E., Sommer, M., Arendasy, M., Neubauer, A.C., 2014c. Intelligence, 
creativity, and cognitive control: the common and differential involvement of executive 
functions in intelligence and creativity. Intelligence 46, 73–83.  
Benedek, M., Schickel, R.J., Jauk, E., Fink, A., Neubauer, A.C., 2014d. Alpha power increases 
in right parietal cortex reflects focused internal attention. Neuropsychologia 56, 393–400.  
Bengtsson, S.L., Csikszentmihalyi, M., Ullén, F., 2007. Cortical regions involved in the 
generation of musical structures during improvisation in pianists. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 19, 830.  
Bengtsson, S., Ehrsson, H.H., Forssberg, H., Ullén, F., 2004. Dissociating brain regions 
controlling the temporal and ordinal structure of learned movement sequences. Eur. J. Neurosci. 
19, 2591–2602.  
Bengtsson, S.L., Ehrrson, H.H., Hashimoto, T., Kito, T., Ullén, F., Naito, E., Sadato, N., 2009. 
Listening to rhythms activates motor and premotor cortex. Cortex 45, 62–71.  
Berkowitz, A.L., 2010. The Improvising Mind: Cognition and Creativity in the Musical Moment. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.  
Berkowitz, A.L., Ansari, D., 2008. Generation of novel motor sequences: the neural correlates of 
musical improvisation. NeuroImage 41, 535–543.  
Berkowitz, A.L., Ansari, D., 2010. Expertise-related deactivation of the right temporoparietal 
junction during musical improvisation. NeuroImage 49, 712–719.  
Beudel,M.,de Jong,B.M.,2009. Overlap and segregation in predorsal premotor cortex activations 
related to free selection of self-referenced and target-based finger movements. Cereb. Cortex 19, 
2361–2371.  
Bischoff-Grethe, A., Goeder, K.M., Willingham, D.T., Grafton, S.T., 2004. Neural substrates of 
response-based sequence learning using fMRI. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 16, 127–138.  
Botvinick, M.M., Cohen, J.D., Carter, C.S., 2004. Conflict monitoring and anterior cingulate 
cortex: an update. Trends Cogn. Sci. 8, 539–546.  
Brown, S., Martinex, M.J., Parsons, L.M., 2006. Music and language side by side in the brain: a 
PET study of the generation of melodies and sentences. Eur. J. Neurosci. 23, 2791–2803.  
Buckner, R.L., Carroll, D.C., 2007. Self-projection and the brain. Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 49–57.  
Bullmore, E., Sporns, O., 2009. Complex brain networks: graph theoretical analysis of structural 
and functional systems. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 10, 186–198.  
Christoff, K., Gordon, A.M., Smallwood, J., 2009. Experience sampling during fMRI reveals 
default network and executive system contributions to mind wandering. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. 
S. A. 106, 8719–8724.  
Chrysikou, E.G.,Weber, M.J., Thompson-Schill, S.L., 2014.A matched filter hypothesis for 
cognitive control. Neuropsychologia 62, 341–355.  
Cocchi, L., Zalesky, A., Fornito, A., Mattingley, J.B., 2013. Dynamic cooperation and 
competition between brain systems during cognitive control. Trends Cogn. Sci. 17, 494–501.  
Corbetta, M., Patel, G., Schulman, G.L., 2008. The reorienting system of the human brain: from 
environment to theory of mind. Neuron 58, 306–324.  
Corbetta, M., Shulman, G.L., 2002. Control of goal-directed and stimulus-driven attention in the 
brain. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 3, 201–215.  
de Manzano, Ö., Ullén, F., 2012a. Activation and connectivity patterns of the presupplementary 
and dorsal premotor areas during free improvisation of melodies and rhythms. NeuroImage 63, 
272–280. 
 de Manzano, Ö., Ullén, F., 2012b. Goal-independent mechanisms for free response generation: 
creative and pseudo-random performance share neural substrates. NeuroImage 59, 772–780.  
Dietrich, A., Kanso, R., 2010. A review of EEG, ERP, and neuroimaging studies of creativity 
and insight. Psychol. Bull. 136, 822–848.  
Donnay, G.F.,Rankin, S.K., Lopez-Gonzalez,M.,Jiradejvong, P., Limb, C.J., 2014. Neural 
substrates of interactive musical improvisation: an fMRI study of ‘trading fours’ in jazz. PLOS 
ONE 3, e88665.  
Dreisbach, G., Haider, H., 2009. How task representations guide attention: further evidence for 
the shielding function oftask sets. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 35, 477–486. Ellamil, M.,  
Dobson, C., Beeman, M., Christoff, K., 2012. Evaluative and generative modes of thought 
during the creative process. NeuroImage 59, 1783–1794.  
Ericsson, K.A., 2013. Training history, deliberate practice and elite sports performance: an 
analysis in response to Tucker and Collins review—what makes champions? Br. J. Sports Med. 
47, 533–535.  
Ericsson, K.A., Krampe, R., Tesch-Römer, C., 1993. The role of deliberate practice in the 
acquisition of expert performance. Psychol. Rev. 100, 363–406.  
Fink, A., Benedek, M., 2014. EEG alpha power and creative ideation. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 
44, 111–123.  
Fink, A., Grabner, R.H., Benedek, M., Reishofer, G., Hauswirth, V., Fally, M., Neubauer, A.C., 
2009. The creative brain: investigation of brain activity during creative problem solving by 
means of EEG and fMRI. Hum. Brain Map. 30, 734–748.  
Forstmann, B.U., Brass, M., Koch, O., von Cramon, D.Y., 2006. Voluntary selection of task sets 
revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 18, 388–398.  
Gerlach, K.D., Spreng, R.N., Madore, K.P., Schacter, D.L., 2014. Future planning: default 
network activity coupes with frontoparietal control network and reward-processing regions 
during process and outcome simulations. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 12, 1942–1951.  
Goldman, A., 2013. Towards a cognitive-scientific research program for improvisation: theory 
and an experiment. Psychomusicol. Music Mind Brain 23, 210–221.  
Gonen-Yaacovi, G., de Souza, L.C., Levy, R., Urbanski, M., Josse, G., Volle, E., 2013. Rostral 
and caudal prefrontal contribution to creativity: a meta-analysis of functional imaging data. 
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7, 465.  
Grabner, R.H., Neubauer, A.C., Stern, E., 2006. Superior performance and neural effi- ciency: 
the impact of intelligence and expertise. Brain Res. Bull. 69, 422–439.  
Gusnard, D.A., Raichle, M.E., 2001. Searching for a baseline: functional imaging and the resting 
human brain. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 2, 685–694.  
Hambrick, D.Z., Oswald, F.L., Altmann, E.M., Meinz, E.J., Gobet, F., Campitelli, G., 2014. 
Deliberate practice: is that all it takes to become an expert? Intelligence 45, 34–45.  
Hambrick, D.Z., Meinz, E.J., 2011. Limits on the predictive power of domain-specific 
experience and knowledge in skilled performance. Curr. Direct. Psychol. Sci. 20, 275–279.  
Hasson, U., Honey, C.J., 2012. Future trends in neuroimaging: neural processes as expressed 
within real-life contexts. NeuroImage 62, 1272–1278.  
Hirshorn, E.A., Thompson-Schill, S.L., 2006. Role of the let inferior frontal gyrus in covert word 
retrieval: neural correlates of switching during verbal fluency. Neuropsychologia 44, 2457–2557.  
Howard-Jones, P.A., Blakemore, S.J., Samuel, E.A., Summers, I.R., Claxton, G., 2005. Semantic 
divergence and creative story generation: an fMRI investigation. Cogn. Brain Res. 25, 240–250.  
Jauk, E., Benedek,M., Neubauer,A.C., 2014. The road to creative achievement: a latent variable 
model of ability and personality predictors. Eur. J. Pers. 28, 95–105.  
Jung, R.E., Mead, B.S., Carrasco, J., Flores, R.A., 2013. The structure of creative cognition in 
the human brain. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7, 330. Karabanov, A., Blom, O., Forsman, L., Ullén, F., 
2009. The dorsal auditory pathway is involved in performance of both auditory and visual 
rhythms. NeuroImage 44, 480–488.  
Kowatari,Y., Hee Lee, S.,Yamamura, H., Nagamori,Y., Levy, P.,Yamane, S.,Yamamoto, M., 
2009. Neural networks involved in artistic creativity. Hum. Brain Map. 30, 1678–1690.  
Lee, C.S., Therriault, D.J., 2013. The cognitive underpinnings of creative thought: A latent 
variable analysis exploring the roles of intelligence and working memory in three creative 
thinking processes. Intelligence 41, 306–320.  
Lewis, C., Lovatt, P.J., 2013. Breaking away from set patterns of thinking: improvisation and 
divergent thinking. Think. Skills Creat. 9, 46–58.  
Limb, C.L., Braun, A.R., 2008. Neural substrates of spontaneous musical performance. An fMRI 
study of jazz improvisation. PLoS ONE 3, e1679.  
Liu, S., Chow, H.M., Xu, Y., Erkkinen, M.G., Swelt, K.E., Eagle, M.W., Braun, A.R., 2012. 
Neural correlates of lyrical improvisation: an fMRI study of freestyle rap. Nat. Sci. Rep. 2, 834.  
McMillan, R.L., Kaufman, S.B., Singer, J.L., 2013. Ode to positive constructive daydreaming. 
Front. Psychol. 4, 626. McPherson, M., Limb, C.J., 2013. Difficulties in the neuroscience of 
creativity: Jazz improvisation and the scientific method. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1303, 80–83.  
Mednick, S.A., 1962. The associative basis of the creative process. Psychol. Rev. 69, 220–232.  
Meinz, E.J., Hambrick, D.Z., 2010. Deliberate practice is necessary but not sufficient to explain 
individual differences in piano sight-reading skill. Psychol. Sci. 21, 914–919.  
Mok, L.W., 2014. The interplay between spontaneous and controlled processing in creative 
cognition. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8, 663.  
Neubauer, A.C., Fink, A., 2009. Intelligence and neural efficiency. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 33, 
1004–1023. Norgaard, M., 2011. Descriptions of improvisational thinking by artist-level jazz 
musicians. J. Res. Music Educ. 59, 109–127.  
Norgaard, M., 2014. How jazz musicians improvise: the central role of auditory and motor 
patterns. Music Percept. Interdiscip. J. 31, 271–287.  
Norgaard, M., Jonathan, S., Marian, M., 2013. Testing cognitive theories by creating a pattern-
based probabilistic algorithm for melody and rhythm in jazz improvisation. Psychomusicol. 
Music Mind Brain 23, 243–254.  
Nusbaum, E.C., Silvia, P.J., 2011. Are intelligence and creativity really so different? Fluid 
intelligence, executive processes, and strategy use in divergent thinking. Intelligence 39, 36–45.  
Nusbaum, E.C., Silvia, P.J., Beaty, R.E., 2014. Ready, set, create: what instructing people to be 
creative reveals about the meaning and mechanisms of divergent thinking. Psychol. Aesthet. 
Creat. Arts 8, 423–432. 
O’Callaghan, C., Shine, J.M., Lewis, S.J., Andrews-Hanna, J.R., Irish, M., 2015. Shaped by our 
thoughts: a new task to assess spontaneous cognition and its associated neural correlates in the 
default network. Brain Cogn. 93, 1–10.  
Pinho,A., de Manzano, Ö., Fransson, P., Eriksson, H., Ullén, F., 2014. Connecting to create: 
expertise in musical improvisation is associated with increased functional connectivity between 
premotor and prefrontal areas.J. Neurosci. 34, 6156–6163.  
Plucker, J.A., 1999. Is the proof in the pudding? Reanalyses of Torrance’s (1958 to present) 
longitudinal data. Creat. Res. J. 12, 103–114.  
Poldrack, R.A., 2006. Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data? Trends 
Cogn. Sci. 10, 59–63. Pressing, J., 1988. Improvisation: methods and models. In: Sloboda, J.A. 
(Ed.), Generative Processes in Music: The Psychology of Performance, Improvisation, and 
Composition. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 129–178.  
Pressing, J., 1998. Psychological constraints on improvisational expertise and communication. 
In: Nettl, B., Russell, M. (Eds.), In the Course of Performance: Studies in the World of Musical 
Improvisation. University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, pp. 47–68.  
Sawyer,R.K., 1992.Improvisational creativity: ananalysis ofjazzperformance.Creat. Res. J. 5, 
253–263. Sawyer, R.K., 2003. Improvised Dialogues: Emergence and Creativity in 
Conversation. Ablex Publishing, Westport, CT.  
Schacter, D.L., Addis, D.R., Hassabis, D., Martin, V.C., Spreng, R.N., Szpunar, K.K., 2012. The 
future of memory: remembering, imagining, and the brain. Neuron 76, 677–694.  
Schubotz, R.I., von Cramon, D.Y., 2001. Interval and ordinal properties of sequences are 
associated with distinct premotor areas. Cereb. Cortex 11, 210–222.  
Silvia, P.J., Beaty, R.E., Nusbaum, E.C., 2013.Verbal fluency and creativity: general and specific 
contributions of broad retrieval ability (Gr)factors to divergentthinking. Intelligence 41, 323–
340.  
Simon, H.A., Chase, W.G., 1973. Skill in chess. Am. Sci. 61, 394–403.  
Sowden, P.T., Pringle, A., Gabora, L., 2014. The shifting sands of creative thinking: connections 
to dual-process theory. Think. Reason. 21, 40–60.  
Spreng, R.N., DuPre, E., Selarka, D., Garcia, J., Gojkovic, S., Mildner, J., Turner, G., 2014. 
Goal-congruent default network activity facilitates cognitive control. J. Nuerosci. 34, 14108–
14114.  
Spreng, R.N., Stevens, W.D., Chamberlain, J.P., Gilmore, A.W., Schacter, D.L., 2010. Default 
network activity, coupled with the frontoparietal control network, supports goal-directed 
cognition. NeuroImage 53, 303–317.  
Torrance, E.P., 1988. The nature of creativity as manifest in its testing. In: Sternberg, R.J. (Ed.), 
The Nature of Creativity: Contemporary Psychological Perspectives. Cambridge University 
Press, New York, pp. 43–75.  
Troyer, A.K., Moscovitch, M., Winocur, G., Alexander, M.P., Stuss, D., 1998. Clustering and 
switching on verbal fluency: the effects of focal frontal- and temporal-lobe lesions. 
Neuropsychologia 36, 499–504.  
Tucker, R., Collins, M., 2012. What makes champions? A review of the relative contribution of 
genes and training to sporting success. Br. J. Sports Med. 46, 555– 561.  
Unsworth, N., Engle, R.W., 2007. The nature of individual differences in working memory 
capacity: active maintenance in primary memory and controlled search from secondary memory. 
Psychol. Rev. 114, 104–132.  
van den Heuvel, M.P., Hulshoff Pol, H.E., 2010. Exploring the brain network: a review of 
resting-state fMRI functional connectivity. Eur. Neuropsychopharmacol. 20, 519–534.  
Walton, M.E., Devlin, J.T., Rushworth, M.F., 2004. Interactions between decision making and 
performance monitoring within prefrontal cortex. Nat. Neurosci. 7, 1259–1265.  
Wan, X., Crüts, B., Jensen, H., 2014. The causal inference of cortical neural networks during 
musical improvisation. PLOS ONE 9, e112776. 
